Once upon a time, stop me if you’ve heard this story before, Anglo diplomats surveyed the ruins of a fallen empire, and hatched a nefarious plan. They insisted on the creation of a militaristic right-wing pseudostate, with borders drawn up in a way that would be deliberately provocative to her neighbors. Then the Western powers all swore that this weird artificial state had inviolable sovereignty and signed unenforceable mutual defense pacts with her. Just creating this imaginary country was a weird and stupid idea, and that decision was made even more weird and stupid by the following mutual defense agreements. Even a small border dispute would immediately and inevitably erupt into a world war, and of course that’s exactly what happened.
If you think I’m talking about 1991 Ukraine, you are correct, but also not correct. I’m talking about 1919 Poland.
Let’s talk about the notorious Molotov-Ribbentrop protocols, Russia’s “moral failure” that the entire western media has spent the last 80 years whining about. I’m not going to go into extreme detail now, so if you want to read more, browse the post I wrote here. But why do we whine about the Soviet Union “allying” with Hitler, but not everyone else? I have some ideas, for now, consider these basic, indisputable facts.
-Hitler invaded Poland and conquered her almost without a fight.
-The Soviets offered the West a mutual strategy to intervene and defeat Hitler. The West refused. Even Poland refused.
-Two weeks after Hitler’s initial invasion, the Red Army crossed the border and occupied Eastern Poland.
-Despite all the crowing about Poland’s inviolable sovereignty, the West did basically nothing about it. They didn’t invade Hitler’s regime. There were also no “sanctions from hell” like what Biden just did to Russia.
Think about how weird this is. On paper, his strategy seemed insane. The combined French and British armies were larger and more mechanized than Germany’s and could easily win. Hitler’s invasion of Poland was so controversial, even some of his own generals considered overthrowing him. What did Hitler know that they didn’t?
Every schoolchild in the West is taught that this was simply cowardice, “appeasement.” The western powers didn’t stop Hitler because they were scared and didn’t want war. Looking back, I can’t imagine how I could ever have believed something so silly. Since when was the West afraid of wars? They certainly didn’t seem shy about fighting wars after Hitler. Perhaps there was another motivation at work. How about the obvious motivation: Hitler was an attack dog against the Soviet Union.
Let me suggest an alternative story that is much more believable than the “appeasement” narrative. In 1919, the creation of Poland was a useful tool against the emerging communist power in the former Russian Empire. But by 1939, Poland was no longer useful. She was just getting annoying, and needed to go away. So the bankers and politicians of the West concocted a plan. Hitler had permission to annex Poland, and would suffer no consequences for it. The West would cry crocodile tears, shift some troops around near Germany’s border, but do nothing else. When Stalin offered help defeat Hitler, of course the West refused because defeating Hitler was never their intention.
What came next was a total surprise and the West has never gotten over their shock. The Soviets had done some backroom dealings of their own, and took the eastern chunk of Poland without firing a shot. Again, I have to ask why is this considered a bad thing? Would it have been better for Hitler to take all of Poland, and put him that much closer to Moscow? In the eyes of the West, yes, that was the preferred outcome, and it was also the outcome everyone expected. Our leaders insist that the Molotov-Ribbentrop protocols were secret, and maybe for once they’re telling the truth.
Hitler didn’t go East, or at least not right away. Instead, he turned on his own masters and went West. That “appeasement” narrative again. Why were Hitler’s campaigns in 1940 so childishly easy? There is this idea that the British army deliberately fled and the French allowed themselves to be subordinated to Hitler and it was all deliberate. But I don’t personally have that level of information and honestly I don’t buy the idea of a conspiracy going that deep.
I think, at this point, surrendering to Hitler was a natural and inevitable reaction. The governments of the West had not taken even basic steps to establish Hitler as an enemy in the eyes of the people, so there was no reason to fight a bloody war with him. If people aren’t given a reason to fight, and don’t stand to lose anything if they’re “conquered,” then why would they fight?
Now consider Ukraine. Russia’s “Operation Z” caught everyone by surprise, myself included. Check out my failed predictions here. Morality of war aside, in practical terms, it was widely believed that the Soviet, I mean Russian, army was not capable of a largescale offensive. Ukraine is a huge country with an equally huge army that is fairly well-equipped and trained. I always assumed that if a Russian intervention were to happen, it would be limited to Donbass. I cannot overstate how astonished I was at the scale of the Russian expedition into Ukraine, and apparently the dictator in Washington shared my surprise. As it turns out, Russia is strong and the West has never been so triggered.
Like in 1939, the West’s realpolitik games have serious chance of blowback, though probably not to the same extreme. Ukraine is not Nazi Germany except in their own minds. But Ukraine is a volatile failed state filled with nazis and military-grade weapons. This war has not caused a serious humanitarian crisis in Russia, but it is shaping up to be a serious problem for the West. Ukraine was a trap set by the West (read my article here), Russia triggered that trap, and there’s an increasingly high chance that it’s backfiring right into our dictators’ faces.
Russia has already made her demands; the dissolution of NATO weapons and infrastructure in Eastern Europe. That’s what they clearly stated many times so we have to assume that’s the overall goal of Operation Z. The Western powers have, so far at least, not dared to directly challenge Russia in a military sense, and the economic warfare is showing growing signs of failure and backfire. If nothing goes seriously wrong, this might be remembered as Russia’s most brilliant maneuver since, well, WWII.
Ian Kummer
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I think Russia has, since 2011 (after Russia failed to veto the Libya ‘no-fly zone’ on the UN Security Council) behaved commendably on the world scene, particularly in Syria. Also setting up the highly informative rt.com news service (now banned in may western ‘democracies’ ) was a great service to humanity. For its part, Poland, in stark contrast to Russia, is playing an unconscionable role on the global stage as a vassal and, though NATO, a formal ally, of the United States.
However, I fail to see how the monstrous treatment of Poland by Stalin from 1939 until at least 2 October 1944, can be excused. On 17 September 1939, as the Nazi German Army was having problems crushing Polish resistance at Warsaw and elsewhere (as I recall from Norman Davies in “Rising ’44 – the Battle for Warsaw” (2003)) the Red Army attacked Poland from the East. Immediately prior to then, a number of leaders of the Polish Communist Party who had escaped the 1938 purge were shot on Stalin’s orders. Subsequently a large number of Polish officers captured by the Red Army were shot at Katyn Wood.
Then, from 1 August 1944 until 2 October 1944, the Warsaw Uprising was crushed whilst the Red Army stood still on the east bank of the Vistula River.
So whilst the crooked Polish government of 1939 (the crookedness of which seems to be matched by that of the Polish government of 2022) helped facilitate Hitler’s aggression against Czechoslovakia as well as its own country, I fail to see how the collusion of the 1939 Polish government with Hitler was less reprehensible than Stalin’s.
monstrous treatment?
Realistically, the 1939 partition restored what the Soviets had lost in 1923 from Belarus and gained them the western provinces of Ukraine. Not sure why Stalin wanted the latter except as strategic depth.
I don’t think Hitler was in any actual deal with the west, though he certainly had western support. Arguably he should have gone east first because that was a continental source of oil. The French were defeated not because they were dumb and didn’t finish the maginiot line but because they didn’t think Hitler would invade through neutral Belgium. The British talk a lot of shit and generally get their asses whipped. Maybe it was just that Hitler figured Stalin wouldn’t reneg before Hitler did.
Overall though, I agree and we’re dealing with issues that are mostly related to drawing and redrawing borders. And if you ever let the Brits redraw borders you can guarantee war over those borders will follow. That’s usually when they run away and then arm both sides.
Ian the analogy to Poland 1919 is sound. The Brits always wanted a thorn in Germany side/ Think of the logic of the Polish Corridor and the separation of Danzig. For me, the Soviet Union always was the puppet of the Private Central Bankers. Certainly, Stalin went rogue when he out-maneuvered everyone’s favorite mass murder Trotsky. However, a large number of Trotsky’s best friends stabbed him in the back as well. The bank gangsters must have had a little input into that slow and silent coup. But if kicking our Trotsky was an unscheduled event, then Stalin and the Soviet Union would have been enemy number one. Yet, here is another contradiction. If Stalin was the ultimate enemy, why did people in the West work so diligently to help Stalin and the Soviet Union secure the bomb?
Poland was a thorn in the side of both Germany and the Soviet Union, these two attributes are not mutually exclusive. Also, Stalin having friends and enemies in the West are not mutually exclusive either. It’s possible for the Western regimes to hate Stalin, while many people, especially left-leaning intellectuals, to like and admire Stalin, and the Soviet Union.
I was struck by the similarities too. I think a case can be made that London manipulated the arrogant Polish military dictatorship to provoke Germany so that when she was reduced to exercising the military option to stop the mayhem, Britain (and her client state France) would have another excuse to finish destroying what was England’s most feared continental economic rival. The rescue of a small nation, Belgium in 1914, was the rationale for England’s first assault. Fear of German military invasion and/or economic conquest was a virtual obsession in British culture and politics since the German states unified in 1871.
Germany had essentially agreed to Poland’s demands to resolve their twenty year border dispute. Meanwhile attacks on ethnic Germans (living on German land now part of Poland) escalated, like the years of killings in the Donbass. Presented in Berlin with Germany’s remarkably generous “Marienwerder” proposals on August 31, 1939 by mediator British ambassador Sir George Ogilivie-Forbes, Polish Minister to Germany Lipski refused to accept the document. It was believed in Warsaw and London that a declaration of war would trigger an immediate uprising against the Hitler government, and there would be no actual war. Alternately any new war was assumed to be like the Great War, a trench war stalemate, in which the Royal Navy throwing another “starvation blockade” around Germany would again be the deciding factor. The power of the radical new technique of “blitzkrieg” was as yet unimaginable.
And one should keep in the mind the role of the United States, then as now interested in destabilizing Europe for its own agenda. Britain was hugely in debt to the US after the American loans that allowed it to barely survive the First World War. Washington had far more influence behind the scenes at Whitehall than is usually recognized. For whatever reasons, FDR’s policies were clear, unmistakable provocations of Germany, and of Japan both. And US Ambassador Joseph Kennedy reported that on August 24, 1939, PM Chamberlain, regretting his promise of unconditional aid to Poland, sent his closest advisor, Sir Horace Wilson, to ask Kennedy if FDR would be willing to use his influence to get the Poles to return to the negotiations they had walked out on. Presented with the chance to avoid a war, FDR declined.
And Stalin’s numerous agents in London informed him that German military action in Poland would result in an immediate war declaration. He cynically offered to protect Germany’s eastern flank in that widely misinterpreted Pact in order to allow German policymakers to exercise the option that he knew would start a European war that would weaken the west for conquest. Four days before Molotov signed the Pact, at the August 19, 139 Politburo meeting, Stalin gave the green light to the total mobilization plan prepared by Chief of the General Staff Boris Shaposhnikov. In the following 22 months, Stalin raised a total of 295 divisions, with additional reserves of six million men, a force larger than all the other armies on earth. It was this host, massing on Europe’s eastern border, that Germany troops caught in all but indefensible forward attack positions in Operation Barbarossa, capturing or killing millions in just a few months in one of the greatest military routs in history. The easy victory emboldened German leaders to think it might be possible to go on to eliminate Stalin’s threat once and for all.
Than as now, things are not what they seem. Among the amoral sociopaths who rise to positions of national leadership, cross and double cross are as natural as breathing.
“If nothing goes seriously wrong, this might be remembered as Russia’s most brilliant maneuver since, well, WWII.”
Doesn’t look it to me. Crimea takeover was brilliant. Overwhelmingly friendly demographics, local population actually got what they wanted, nobody got hurt. Donbas 2014-2015 was, a dangerous potential escalation skillfully averted. 7 years of flawed but livable compromise reached.
Ukraine today is not the same. The demographics are no longer reflected in institutions and power centers. A less confident hegemon needs a win, and the situation presents an opportunity to leverage ethnic resentments into the familiar cycle of violence and terror. Divide and conquer… can’t do it with the top countries any longer, but it sure works great in the less wealthy ones.
And the Russian leadership, for whatever combination of reasons, thought this was the time and place to make a stand against the US. If one adopts the mindset of a Kissinger type, i.e. overlooks the masses of dead and broken people, and if the world’s luck holds out, then the geopolitics may yet work out for Russia. Possibly with a different leader in a few years, maybe even return of the KPRF if they are organized enough. But it’s set to be a drawn out bloodbath. And when it does end, the big western portion of Ukraine which Russia can’t hope to occupy… profoundly screwed. Doomed to another generation of trauma and hatred, liable to export right-wing extremism to all its neighbors for many years.
“What came next was a total surprise and the West has never gotten over their shock.”
Almost. On 16 August 1939, the British Deputy Chiefs of Staff predicted that if the August ’39 Anglo0French-Soviet staff talks in Moscow failed.
In mid-August 1939, an Anglo-French military delegation travelled to Moscow to conduct military staff talks with the Soviet defense minister Voroshilov & Chief of the Soviet General Staff, General Shaposhnikov.The Anglo-French-Soviet military staff talks then going on in Moscow had run up on a question by Voroshilov: “Will the Polish government permit the Red Army to enter Poland and conduct operations there in the event of a German attack on Poland. The Anglo-French did not know the answer, so they sent some officers to Warsaw to ask.
The day after Voroshilov’s question, the Deputy Chiefs of Staff of the British armed forces wrote that accepting the Soviet position was Poland’s only hope of resisting a German attack for more than a brief period of time.
Unfortunately, the Polish gvt disagreed, and refused their only hope of successfully resisting a German attack. And in paragraph 12 the DCoS predicted the M-R Pact as the most likely Soviet response to that Polish refusal.
Begin quote:
DCOS 179
Committee of Imperial Defence
Deputy Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee of the Chiefs of Staff Committee
Russian conversations: Use of Polish and Roumanian territory by Russian forces
At our meeting on 16th August 1939 we gave consideration to the military aspects of the action proposed in connection with Mission Telegram #3 from the Russian mission in Moscow and Telegram # 197 from H.M Ambassador Moscow.
2. We understand that action has already been taken by the French government on the lines suggested in the above mentioned telegram.
3. From the military point of view, we welcome the action which has been taken. We feel that this is no time for half-measures and that every effort should be made to persuade Poland and Roumania to agree to the use of their territory by Russian forces.
4. In our opinion it is only logical that the Russians be given every facility for rendering assistance and putting their maximum weight into the scale on the side of the anti-aggression powers. We consider it so important to meet the Russians in this matter that, if necessary, the strongest pressure should be exerted on Poland and Roumania to persuade them to adopt a helpful attitude.
5. In view of the speed with which events are moving, it is possible that this report will be to a large extent out-of-date before there is time to circulate it, but we feel that it may be of advantage to put on record certain general observations on the broad question of the use of Polish and Roumanian territory by the Russian forces.
6. We are in entire agreement with the Ambassador and Admiral Drax that the problem now raised by the Russians is fundamental and we consider that even if the Russians are willing to continue conversations without agreement on this point, the results to be expected from the ensuing conversations would be of very little value.
7. It is perfectly clear that without early and effective Russian assistance, the Poles cannot hope to stand up to a German attack on land or in the air for more than a limited time. The same applies to Roumania except that the time would be still more limited. The supply of arms and war material is not enough. If the Russians are to collaborate in resisting German aggression against Poland or Roumania they can only do so effectively on Polish or Roumanian soil; and, as the Ambassador points out, if permission for this is withheld till war breaks out, it would then be too late. The most the Allies could then hope for would be to avenge Poland and Roumania and perhaps restore their independence as a result of the defeat of Germany in a long war.
8. Without immediate and effective Russian assistance, not only in the air, but on land, the longer that war would be, and the less chance there would be of Poland or Roumania emerging at the end of it as independent States in anything like their original form.
9. If war does come the Poles and Roumanians will find themselves with their backs to the wall and they will inevitably be only too glad to seek support from any source. Unless the Poles and Roumanians have faced this fact beforehand, the assistance they will receive will be much less than if preparations and plans have been made in advance.
10. We suggest that it is now necessary to present this unpalatable truth to both the Poles and the Roumanians. To the Poles especially it ought to be pointed out that they have obligations to us as well as we to them; and that it is unreasonable for them to expect us blindly to implement our guarantee to them if, at the same time they will not cooperate in measures designed for a common purpose.
11. The conclusion of a treaty with Russia appears to us to be the best way of preventing a war. The satisfactory conclusion of this treaty will undoubtably be endangered if the present Russian proposals for cooperation with Poland and Roumania were turned down by these countries.
12. At the worst if the negotiations with Russia break down, a Russo-German rapprochement may take place of which the probable consequence will be Russia and Germany decide to share the spoils and concert in a new partition of the Eastern European States. Alternatively, Russia might stand out as a neutral in the war and, unexhausted at its conclusion, take advantage of the subsequent chaos to take what she will from her neighbors.
Presumably, both the above alternatives must be equally repugnant to the Poles and the Roumanians.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we wish to emphasize once more our view that, if necessary, the strongest pressure should be brought on Poland and Roumania to agree in advance to the use of their territory by Russian forces, in the event of attack by Germany.
T.S.V. Phillips
H.R. Pownall (for D.C.I.G.S)
J.C. Slessor (for D.C.A.S)
16th August 1939
Cab 54 11 pgs 217-220
End quote.
“The Soviets had done some backroom dealings of their own, and took the eastern chunk of Poland without firing a shot. Again, I have to ask why is this considered a bad thing? Would it have been better for Hitler to take all of Poland, and put him that much closer to Moscow?”
Precisely, and that’s why the Deputy Chiefs of Staff predicted that the Soviets would most likely “divide the spoils”
“In the eyes of the West, yes, that was the preferred outcome, and it was also the outcome everyone expected.”
What shocked the West is the idea that Hitler would make a deal with Stalin, not the reverse.
Here’s a quote from a little book I have, published in November 1939, explaining why the British government declared war on Germany.
“For all the other acts of brutality at home and aggression
without, Herr Hitler had been able to offer an excuse, inadequate
indeed, but not fantastic. The need for order and discipline in Europe,
for strength at the centre to withstand the incessant infiltration of
false and revolutionary ideas – this is certainly no more than the
conventional excuse offered by every military dictator who has ever
suppressed the liberties of his own people or advanced the conquest
of his neighbors. Nevertheless, so long as the excuse was offered
with sincerity, and in Hitler’s case the appearance of sincerity were
not lacking over a period of years, the world’s judgement of the man
remained more favorable than its judgement of his actions. The faint
possibility of an ultimate settlement with Herr Hitler still, in these
circumstances, remained, however abominable his methods, however
deceitful his diplomacy, however intolerant he might show himself of
the rights of other European peoples, he still claimed to stand
ultimately for something which was a common European interest, and
which therefore could conceivably provide some day a basis for
understanding with other nations equally determined not to sacrifice
their traditional institutions and habits on the bloodstained altars
of the World Revolution.
The conclusion of the German-Soviet pact removed even this faint
possibility of an honorable peace.”
Lord Lloyd of Dolobran “The British Case” Eyre & Spottiswoode Limited.
London, 1939, pgs 54-5, with a preface by Lord Halifax, the Foreign
Secretary.
And Lord Lloyd was no isolated right-wing crank. Within months of his book being published, he was a member of Churchill’s Cabinet, the Secretary of State for Colonies. You’re totally correct that the Anglo-French had done nothing to prepare their people psychologically for war with Germany, and that’s a decent explanation for the lack of fighting spirit in the West in 1940. Hitler had not been vilified by either the British of French governments. They had saved all their vilification for Stalin, So the surprise in 1939 is not that Stalin would do a deal with Hitler, it was that Hitler would do a deal with Stalin.
That’s the essence of the paragraph I cited from Lord Lloyd’s book.
Thank you very much for sharing this. That’s an excellent bit of history that I was until now completely unaware of. I’m also not surprised that the little voice of reason was coming from the French. I think it’s fair to say that most of the ideological impetus behind provoking Germany and the USSR was coming from the Brits, the French were more passive. I don’t have the evidence to say that as an absolute statement, however.
“So the surprise in 1939 is not that Stalin would do a deal with Hitler, it was that Hitler would do a deal with Stalin.”
Yes I absolutely agree. Stalin and the Ruskis were expected to be sneaky, untrustworthy asiatics. Hitler was supposed to be part of the “collective West” who could be trusted to go East, and he did the opposite.