The Fatal Scale Error in the Ukraine War

I think I have an explanation for what’s happening, and not happening, in Ukraine. I’ve looked and not seen anyone else make this observation, so maybe I’m a genius. It’s a fatal scale error.

In late February and early March I had a general feeling of total disbelief. Not only did I not believe the mainstream news reports coming out of Ukraine, I couldn’t understand how anyone else believes it. We are a generation of people with almost 100% literacy and high exposure to visual media like movies, computer games.

We have books and encyclopedia entries about past wars, including relatively recent wars in Ukraine. We can look up battles that happened in East Ukraine between the Soviets and Europeans in 1944, and battles between the Kiev government and separatists in 2015. Even if we can’t fly to Ukraine and see these battles for ourselves, we should at least have a general understanding of the general principles at work.

For example, you should know that a hundred men can’t beat a thousand men, or at least not without some extraordinary advantage working in their favor. You should also be able to infer basic truths for yourself. For example, two large armies fighting each other will cause more deaths and destruction than two much smaller armies. That’s an obvious truth, right? Right? I wrote this on February 26:

Regarding the claims that the Ukrainians killed 2,800 Russians and destroyed more than 580 vehicles… come on. I don’t feel like I should even need to explain why that’s a stupid thing to believe. The 1943 Battle of Kursk was the single largest tank battle in human history, and lasted 46 days. Overall, the Germans destroyed 7,000 Soviet tanks and guns (and still failed, by the way). Of course those losses weren’t evenly distributed, but on average that’s a little over 152 vehicle kills a day. The Ukrainians destroyed 500?

A child who plays a board game like Axis and Allies, or a computer game like Age of Empires understands most of the basic principles of war, whether or not he knows the terms for them. In World War I, British engineer Frederick Lanchester developed Lanchester’s laws for calculating attrition between two opposing forces.

Of course I’m sure people in the comments are going to say something like “well it’s more money for the military-industrial complex.” Sure, and that’s the problem with having an MIC that’s not subordinate to the state. When an MIC can do whatever it wants with no accountability, that country will always lose. If an MIC can make tons of money whether or not that country wins, well, how can anyone really argue that this is an effective system that can win? Could the USA win a war against Russia? Well, they have weapons that actually work, and I’m not so confident that ours do.

Look, ultimately, I don’t think Washington is deliberately throwing the game, and they do actually believe that Ukraine has a chance of pushing the Russians out. Every single pro-war enthusiast I have met is absolutely convinced that this is possible, and I see no reason to believe that they’re all lying. NATO is sending Ukraine 90 howitzers and some broke-down German panzers, and is convinced that this is a winning strategy.

Here’s a great piece from Moon of Alabama, and some points I want to highlight from it.

-Western politicians have outlandishly ambitious aims in Ukraine – not just to push Russian troops out, but to weaken and force regime change in Russia itself. The claims are actually getting more outlandish, not less.

-The majority of Ukrainian casualties are being caused by artillery. They’re getting cut to pieces before they even have a chance to fight (remember this point, it’s relevant to what I’m going to say later).

-Ukraine’s prospects are looking bad, and this will likely end in catastrophe due to false narratives.

I do have an explanation for what’s going on, and it’s more complex than simple lies and propaganda. First, some background information.

Lanchester’s Linear Law, from Wikipedia:

For ancient combat, between phalanxes of soldiers with spears, say, one soldier could only ever fight exactly one other soldier at a time. If each soldier kills, and is killed by, exactly one other, then the number of soldiers remaining at the end of the battle is simply the difference between the larger army and the smaller, assuming identical weapons.

The linear law also applies to unaimed fire into an enemy-occupied area. The rate of attrition depends on the density of the available targets in the target area as well as the number of weapons shooting. If two forces, occupying the same land area and using the same weapons, shoot randomly into the same target area, they will both suffer the same rate and number of casualties, until the smaller force is eventually eliminated: the greater probability of any one shot hitting the larger force is balanced by the greater number of shots directed at the smaller force.

As warfare between Greek city states evolved, competing armies discovered that they could add other variables to a battle besides sheer weight in numbers. For starters, equipping soldiers with longer pikes meant that more rows of the phalanx could fight at one time. Longer pikes in the absence of any other variable meant the phalanx could win faster and with fewer casualties. Additional units and weapons like chariots, cavalry, slingers, and archers could create additional ways to inflict losses on the enemy and break his morale.

Thanks to these additional dimensions, Lanchester’s Linear Law is no longer useful, which brings us to his square law. From Wikipedia:

With firearms engaging each other directly with aimed shooting from a distance, they can attack multiple targets and can receive fire from multiple directions. The rate of attrition now depends only on the number of weapons shooting. Lanchester determined that the power of such a force is proportional not to the number of units it has, but to the square of the number of units. This is known as Lanchester’s square law.

Note that Lanchester’s square law does not apply to technological force, only numerical force; so it requires an N-squared-fold increase in quality to compensate for an N-fold decrease in quantity.

More precisely, the law specifies the casualties a shooting force will inflict over a period of time, relative to those inflicted by the opposing force. In its basic form, the law is only useful to predict outcomes and casualties by attrition. It does not apply to whole armies, where tactical deployment means not all troops will be engaged all the time. It only works where each unit (soldier, ship, etc.) can kill only one equivalent unit at a time. For this reason, the law does not apply to machine guns, artillery with unguided munitions, or nuclear weapons. The law requires an assumption that casualties accumulate over time: it does not work in situations in which opposing troops kill each other instantly, either by shooting simultaneously or by one side getting off the first shot and inflicting multiple casualties.

In modern military science, improvements in an army’s soldiers, tactics, and weapons are known as force multipliers. For example, a new marksmanship training program doubles a soldier’s effectiveness. So 100 of soldiers who graduated the training can, in the absence of other variables, equal 200 enemy soldiers without the training. So the training program is a force multiplier of 2. Dividing 100 soldiers into 10 smaller units that can work more efficiently is another example of a force multiplier. Technological advantages like radios and better weapons are another category of a force multiplier. Of course there is a limitless number of other examples, including situational force multipliers like standing on a hill or digging a trench. Lanchester’s Square Law is useful to give a general awareness of how two opposing armies’ numbers and firepower influence attrition, it can’t by itself predict success and failure.

The famous 3:1 rule is based on Lanchester’s Square Law. According to the 3:1 rule, an attacking ground force must have a 3:1 numerical advantage to the defending force. This ratio is based on the assumption that the defending force, thanks to force multipliers inherent with being in a strong fortified position, grants offensive firepower three times greater than that of the attackers. The 3:1 rule actually is the break-even ratio. Based on the assumption that being on the defensive is a force multiplier of 3, the attacker needs 3x superiority to achieve a “break even force ratio,” in which he can defeat the defenders with a casualty ratio of 1:1.  According to a 1995 RAND report, Aggregation, Disaggregation, and the 3:1 Rule in Ground Combat:

The basis of the 3:1 law (see the appendix) is the notion that the defender has a substantial, factor-of-three, advantage if he has prepared positions and good defensive terrain, which reduce his vulnerability and increase the vulnerability of the attacker (e.g., by channelization) (Dupuy, 1987). The square law is assuredly not a statement of general truth. For example, it does not apply to meeting engagements or mobile warfare more generally. Later, we shall consider cases where the defender has no such advantage.

3:1 is more of guideline than a rule, and is almost meaningless at the theater level of military operations, especially in a war like this one where the Russian army has demonstrated a high level of mobility and the Ukrainian army is apparently not mobile at all.

I just threw a lot of information at the reader, but there is one last quotation I would like to give you. From Adolf von Schell’s famous 1933 book Battle Leadership:

“Owing to the uncertainty of battle and the lack of enemy information, it is essential that a leader keep out reserves. Reserves, however, are meant to be used. In battle it is only the fighting soldier that brings an advantage. As the information of the enemy changes, it is the tendency of a leader to move his reserves according to his momentary conception of the situation…

In the foregoing example, the 14th Division, which was the Army reserve, was so moved. Its different movements, some of which were necessary and some not, illustrate the fact that in war there will be much marching and countermarching, the reasons for which the troops will not perceive. They must be taught in peace to expect this. The leader, of course, should always have regard for the fact that useless marches not only diminish the physical capacity of his troops, but seriously affect their morale as well. On the other hand, soldiers should be made to realize that the changing conditions of battle will frequently result in marches which later prove to be unnecessary. They must be taught to endure this with calmness and fortitude.

Let me repeat the two outstanding lessons that should be learned from the foregoing account:

1. In open warfare a leader will have to give his orders without having complete information. At times only his own will is clear. If he waits for complete information before acting he will never make a decision

2. The strength and morale of reserves must be conserved in order to reap the full benefit of their freshness when they are finally committed to action.”

Taking all of this into account, here is my attempt to summarize how to win a battle, or a war.

Expose as much of the enemy force to attrition as possible, and for as long as possible, while minimizing your own force’s exposure to attrition, while still utilizing them 100% at key moments of the operation for the purposes they’re suitable for.

Here’s an analogy. An army is an object that’s fluid and can be molded into any shape, like water. However, the more you do this, the more your army suffers attrition. You dump a bucket of water on the floor and try to mop it up again, you’ll still lose some. And understand that attrition isn’t just combat losses. Ships and planes crash just from cruising around in peacetime. Soldiers roll their ankles, trucks break drown, and equipment wears out whether or not there’s a war on. Any military unit, whether it is a tank battalion or a crew on a warship, will degrade over time unless they are given sufficient time to rest and refit. Think of a battle like a sports game. A team with many fresh players on the bench will probably win against a team that doesn’t.

Ideally, the enemy should be exposed all the way to their rear echelons to disruption by indirect fire and air attacks. Their soldiers should all be on high alert, suffering high rates of attrition from injuries, fatigue, and desertion, but not able to use their weapons to hurt you. Meanwhile, your own army should be exposed to as little combat as possible, and maintaining large reserves. Those reserves can be used for anything, from replacing or reinforcing units actively engaged in combat operations, or opening new fronts at key times and places.

To give some practical examples, if five soldiers can lob mortar rounds into the enemy camp and keep a whole battalion on high alert all night, that’s a success. If the enemy issues a general mobilization and empties their prisons to respond to a small group of paratroopers, that’s a success. Yet at the same time, the enemy should be unable to effectively respond to your main attacks, so they meet little resistance. In a nutshell, the enemy should overreact to your feints and underreact to your main effort. I said this in early April:

The entire western media is still endlessly and hysterically talking about Kiev, but western leaders (as far as I can tell from publicly available information) have done almost nothing to help the Ukrainian troops stuck in the Donbass “cauldron.” In other words, Ukraine and her puppetmasters wildly overreacted to Russian forces in the Kiev region and underreacted to Russian forces in the Donbass region. I would certainly call that a success on Russia’s part.

None of these principles are new or earth-shattering. It’s all common sense and I’m not exaggerating when I say a child who plays strategy computer games understands all of this already.  Anyone who is good at chess understands all of this already. Sending your army piecemeal in unsupported attacks will result in it being destroyed. Some units or game pieces are faster or longer range than others. If you spend all of your time responding to things the enemy did, that means he’s probably in control and you’re going to lose. In a war of attrition, if the enemy is destroying your weapons faster than you can send them in, you’re going to lose.

With all that in mind, what’s going on with this colossal $40 billion aid package that the Biden regime is sending to Ukraine? Drones, small arms and anti-tank munitions are cool, but not what Ukraine would need for a counter-offensive. Claymore mines are cool for turning Ukraine into a nightmarish hellhole. Kids will still be stepping on those mines 50 years from now (look at what happened to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia). But again, not useful for a counteroffensive.

Honestly, the only part of the American weapons package I found significant was the 90 M777 155mm howitzers and 183,000 rounds of ammunition. Assuming a battery has 6 guns and 3 batteries in a battalion, that’s 15 batteries, 5 battalions, roughly a division’s worth of guns. But I’m not sure that matters. Artillery supports maneuver units one echelon higher. So an artillery battery would support an infantry battalion, an artillery battalion would support a regiment, and so on.

As I’ve mentioned numerous times in previous posts, I have not seen any compelling evidence that the Ukrainian armed forces are capable of operating in large units. Can they adequately handle local territorial defense that doesn’t require any maneuver or coordination? Sure. But a counteroffensive is an entirely different game.

Regarding ammunition, assuming that an artillery division consumes about 1,000 rounds a day, 183,000 would last for roughly six months. I’m basing that assumption on this being a “real” conventional war against an equal opponent in a target-rich environment. To give you some context, let’s say an artillery battery is ordered to suppress an enemy position for 10 minutes, firing two rounds a minute. With six guns, that’s 12 rounds a minute, 120 rounds total, and that was just one mission. Now here’s the thing about the M777, it’s never been in a “real” war since it first entered service in the early 2000s. Firing a few rounds here and there at small groups of insurgents isn’t the same as sustained round-the-clock usage for months on end. How well are these guns, which I assume are old to begin with, going to hold up without maintenance? Will enough spare parts be sent to keep these guns in service? Will Ukrainians be trained to be able to do that themselves? Great question, no idea.

Those M777s are apparently the best Ukraine is getting, because Europe’s contribution is a joke. Like Germany’s 88 (I know) Leopard tanks, Gepard anti-air guns, British cougars, and everything else all have the same problems with interoperability with Ukraine’s existing maintenance and logistical facilities. It’s a pretty bad sign that Germany is begging anyone who will listen for 35mm ammunition for the Gepard, and apparently the bullet situation for the Leopard isn’t much better.

I’ve heard a lot of rumors over the years that the EU, despite all of their bluster, is a total joke and they aren’t even remotely prepared for a large conventional war with Russia, or anyone else. From what I’ve heard, including from Americans who have been stationed in Europe, their vehicle fleets are a disaster and European governments are too cheap and lazy to do anything about it. With what I’m seeing, those rumors are apparently true. Remember when Trump told Euros that they would have to start paying their share of NATO and just how mad that made them?

There’s the additional question of bulk fuel. Where is it going to come from? Another thing that Ukraine desperately needs is tech, like radar units and C2 assets to replace what was destroyed. Anyway, fuel or not, a few hundred vehicles, that are all random with little to no interchangeability in parts, are not going to be anywhere close to enough to replace the thousands upon thousands of vehicles that have been destroyed. Again, if the enemy is destroying vehicles faster than you can send them, it’s a pointless exercise.

So what’s going on? Are they stupid or what? Maybe, but I have a specific explanation for what’s happening, which I alluded to in my clickbait headline. It’s scale error.

A scale error happens when a very young child fails to use visual information about the size of an object and tries to perform an impossible action on it. For example, a child might try to climb inside an impossibly small toy car or sit on an impossibly small doll chair.

There was a study conducted in 2004, Scale Errors Offer Evidence for a Perception-Action Dissociation Early in Life, that studied scale errors made by children aged 18 to 30 months. Experimenters would put a child in a room with three large toys, a slide, a car, and a chair. After being exposed to and interacting with these three large objects, the child would be moved to a play area with three identical, but much smaller versions of these toys, a doll-sized slide, car, and chair.

Many of the children, especially around the age of 20 months, would commit a scale error and try to interact with the doll-sized toys the same as they had with the child-sized toys. Interestingly, these children would perform movements correctly in relation to the size of the toy, like squatting the correct distance from the floor to touch the chair or get “inside” the toy car. In other words, a child would fail to use size information in making the decision whether or not to interact with a toy, but still use size information correctly in his attempt. Furthermore, in a separate control study, when given instructions and the choice between a large toy and its tiny equivalent, children would always correctly choose the large one.

“We propose that scale errors involve a dissociation in young children’s use of visual information for planning versus controlling their actions, as well as a failure of inhibitory control. Whenever a child encounters a replica of an object from a highly familiar category, visual information from the replica—its shape, color, texture, and so on—activates the child’s representation of the category of larger objects that the replica stands for. Thus, seeing a chair activates the child’s representation of the general category of typical chairs… What typically happens at this point is that visual registration of the miniature size of the replica leads to inhibition of the activated motor routine associated with its larger counterparts. Instead of committing a scale error, the child behaves appropriately, either ignoring the replica or perhaps playing with it as a toy.”

Occasionally, however, the available size information does not serve to inhibit the activated motor representation, and the child forms an action plan based on the original object or general category of objects (e.g., the child decides to sit in the chair). Once the plan is initiated, however, visual information about the actual size of the replica object is used to calibrate the movements directed toward it. Thus, the child performs finely tuned actions on a miniature object based on his or her current visual representation of that particular object, but the motor plan instigating those actions is based on the child’s representation of a different, larger object.”

So there you have it. NATO is used to fighting in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. Now presented with another war, the bureaucracy is responding the way it’s used to, literally like a toddler trying to climb inside an impossibly small toy car. The difference being when a toddler falls on his butt it’s cute and funny. When NATO does it, 50,000 Ukrainians die.

Featured image source: Feeloona on Pixabay

Ian Kummer

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