The Myth That Insurgencies Are “Harder” Than Conventional Wars

Almost daily I get comments on social media that guerrilla wars are the “Achilles’ Heel” of American forces. We are the greatest military force to ever exist in human history, but enemies keep insisting on using unfair tactics. I hate to break it to you, but “conventional” nation state enemies are not easier to beat than guerrillas, they’re harder, much harder.

For reference, let’s look at an article by John Nagl in Autumn 2022:

ABSTRACT: Since achieving victory in World War II, the United States
military has a less-than-enviable combat record in irregular warfare. This
detailed historical analysis provides perspective on where past decisions and
doctrines have led to defeat and where they may have succeeded if given
more time or executed differently. In doing so, it provides lessons for future
Army engagements and argues that until America becomes proficient
in irregular warfare, our enemies will continue to fight us at the lower levels
of the spectrum of conflict, where they have a good chance of exhausting our
will to fight.

“Will to fight,” that is basically what his whole argument boils down to. Nagl laments Americans don’t have the “will” to die by the tens of thousands in regions of the world that are totally irrelevant to us. Therefore, even “lower level” (weak) opponents can beat us. The obvious needs to be pointed out. If a “weak” group of people win a war, then they weren’t weak.

Nagl’s whole argument boils down to one specific point in history:

While the war in Europe for which the Army had prepared never emerged—in
no small part because of the Army’s deterrent effect—the training and technology
purchased at such great cost were put to the test in 1991 to overturn Saddam
Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. The largest deployment of American troops since
Vietnam demonstrated convincingly America’s ability to defeat conventional
opponents on a battlefield devoid of civilians [Emphasis mine]. It was the Army’s sole clear victory
in the post–World War II period, even if the political result of the military
accomplishment was less clear. Hussein withdrew his defeated forces from Kuwait
but remained in power and a threat to regional stability

So this is what Nagl meant when he complained that America’s enemies will “search for gaps in our armor.” They won’t be stupid and leave their whole armies in flat terrain with inadequate air defenses. There also won’t be any pesky civilian NPCs getting in the way of our missiles and machine guns.

America won Desert Storm and never shut up about it because Saddam gave us the victory our political establishment desperately needed to justify continued military spending after the Cold War. If he had done literally anything else, it wouldn’t have been such a clean victory that the USA could claim proved our infinite superiority.

In Spring 2023 a G. L. Lamborn wrote a rebuttal to Nagl:

Where Nagl takes his argument, however, is deep into the territory
of wishful thinking. His exposition focuses on what the Army might have
done, should have done, or should not have done. Unfortunately, he fails
to consider that each of these adventures was doomed at its inception—
not by anything the Army did or did not do, but because of fundamental,
underlying political and cultural realities brushed aside by policymakers.
The Army’s failing in the field, therefore, lies mainly with the policy
community here at home, as the tasks assigned were beyond hope
of success. A contrary view to Nagl’s would indicate that none of the
failed campaigns could have been successful regardless of the doctrine
followed, the weaponry employed, or the amount of time allotted.
Army failures resulted from fundamental flaws of national policy and
a failure at all levels to appreciate the nature of the struggles at hand.

While that is a true statement, Lamborn makes an odd claim of his own:

Insurgencies differ fundamentally from Clausewitzian theory in at least
three major ways. First, insurgency is an internal war. It is not fought
one nation against another, the way Clausewitz and most other Western
thinkers conceive of war. Rather, it is fought by part of the people against
the established regime in their own country—a regime many perceive
as illegitimate. Insurgencies can only take place under certain dysfunctional
political and social conditions and can only be understood in terms
of the insurgents’ cause and the people who support it.

This is a strange statement that to some extent engages in the same fallacious thinking as Nagl. “Clausewitzian” warfare is a reference to the distinction between military, government, and civilian pillars of a nation state. Lamborn’s assumption here seems to be that in “conventional” war the general public is passive. I don’t think there’s any basis for that and don’t recall Clausewitz ever saying such a thing. Men and women, and even children, all participate in a war effort in some way according to their abilities. If the general public is uninterested in or actually against a war, of course it will be lost. People can’t be forced to fight. He also over-emphasizes the insurgency aspect of guerrilla warfare. An insurgency is a specific situation when guerrilla warfare can happen, but it is not the only one. Even in such internal conflicts, it is still usually one nation (ethnic group) of people fighting a different one.

The overemphasis on “insurgency” also implies through omission that “conventional” wars aren’t generally fought for the same reasons as guerrilla movements. Consider the conflict in Ukraine. Both “ethnic Ukrainians” and “ethnic Russians” (which is mostly a self-applied identity) probably think the only two options are victory or death. If we apply this principle to Afghanistan, this was a fight between Pashtun and Dari-speakers with American support. Yet after the USA withdrew, there was no genocide. The Taliban successfully negotiated a mostly peaceful resolution with their tribal enemies, and did so under the noses of the western occupation forces. This is a demonstration of a high degree of acumen, hardly the “lower level” ignorant cave dwelling savages as American warhawks would have us believe.

In his article, Nagl had this to say about post-war Afghanistan:

Afghanistan could have enjoyed the same fate—a violent and imperfect one,
but better than the starvation and absolute paucity of human rights that now mar
the face of a country to which America devoted thousands of lives, billions of
dollars, and two decades of effort.

Yet the Taliban did not immediately close down the girls’ school for example, which shows that they were willing to negotiate on ideological issues. If the “democratic West” continued economic cooperation and had not stolen Afghanistan’s bank assets, in all probability there would still be girls’ education up to the present day. So the Taliban was willing to negotiate while western leaders were not. I think this is also partly why the Taliban won and the West did not. Who exactly was the fanatic in this situation? Willingness to make concessions even on issues he disagrees with is the mark of a civilized person, isn’t it?

I think such statements are a combination of believing your own propaganda and projection. Supposedly, America’s “enemies” are slave races ruled by unpopular dictators who would be immediately overthrown if a war goes badly.

But really, the opposite is more true. The American state is a globalist entity that is indifferent or actually hostile to the American nation. Meanwhile, most of America’s “enemies” are typical nation states mostly aligned with national interests. For example, the Russian state represents the Russian people. Putin doesn’t make speeches boasting about making Russians a minority in their own country.

This is very apparent in how state-funded and corporate media discuss ongoing wars. Every mainstream news article is framed around one question: “How can we stop those right-wing extremist white nationalists from ruining our righteous and just wars?” If we let the white nationalists win, they’ll cut off weapons and money to Ukraine and moderate rebels in Syria, how dare they! Every foreign policy issue is framed as helpless and innocent foreigners being oppressed by bad stupid ignorant racist Americans. How could Americans be so bigoted and homophobic that they don’t want to die in foreign wars and provide unlimited funding to death squads?

I find it hilarious when people online cry that Russia has the nerve to go to war over ethnic Russians outside their borders. So what would you prefer? It is fine to invade another country because they aren’t gay enough but protecting your own ethnic majority is bad?

So bottom line, public support is important regardless of what tactics are being used. This is why American writers repeatedly whine about those stupid civilians, because all of our wars are fought for terrible reasons that no sane person would like. Whining about guerrillas is also a coping mechanism to cover up an obvious truth. If an army cannot beat guerrillas, they also cannot beat a conventional army. If the USA was unable and/or unwilling to beat the Taliban as they were, would it have been easier if the Taliban had their own air force and cruise missiles? Of course not and it is ridiculous to even make such an argument.

One thing is true, as technology progresses and saturates the world, the gap between “conventional” state armies and “unconventional” non-state armies narrows. Even as these “unconventional” forces lean more into conventional weapons, advocates of the American empire will continue to howl that they don’t play fair. I swear, please believe me, going to war against Russia or China would be easier than fighting guys in sandals. I promise!

Ian Kummer

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