The Hamas-Israeli Conflict: What’s Happened So Far

If a time traveler came to me ten or even five years ago and told me one of the most brilliant military operations in modern history would be carried out by Hamas of all people, I would not have believed him. And yet here we are.

Hamas commenced Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on October 7, the anniversary of the Yom Kippur War. Like the Yom Kippur War, this attack caught the Israelis totally by surprise. Incidentally, the Al-Aqsa mosque is a holy site targeted zionist extremists, provoking widespread Muslim anger, hence the name of the operation.

When this conflict first kicked off I didn’t pay much attention to it because, let’s be honest, violent incidents between the Israeli occupiers and their Palestinian subjects are frequent and rarely do much to the status quo. But as the hours passed, it quickly became apparent that this is different. Here’s a graphic of the situation as of today:

This seems to be a classic deep operation launched in many directions by air, land, and sea, but with a clear main effort in mind: to physically reconnect the Gaza strip and West Bank. What astonished me the most is how embarrassing and totally ineffective the IDF response has been so far. Israel has more than a million people bottled up in what is essentially a giant nazi concentration camp democratic freedom camp, and couldn’t be bothered to guard it properly? What happened? I found a pretty good explanation on the Donbass Devushka channel on Telegram. I wouldn’t call this the definitive end-all explanation, but it’s adequate based on what is publicly known so far:

“Every detail is important both individually and in the context of questions for the Israeli security system.

➡️Anomaly #1 – Israel was unaware of the attack’s preparation.

Gaza is a small piece of land, covering 365 square kilometers. It was believed that it was monitored and surveyed by the Israeli army and intelligence agencies extensively, but during the attack, it became apparent that this was not the case. Presumably, Hamas developed a communication and coordination system that excluded electronic contacts, and somehow Palestinians managed to hide everything from Israeli intelligence.

➡️Anomaly #2 – Israel couldn’t prevent the attack.

Shortly before the strike on checkpoints and major cities on October 7th, Hamas systematically moved rocket launchers, ground forces, paragliders, and other equipment into position. The preparation and initial moves went unnoticed, and a preemptive strike was not carried out.

Anomaly #3 – The border alarm system didn’t work.

The electronic systems on the border, which Israel invested billions of dollars in construction and equipment, turned out to be useless. Numerous cameras and sensors failed to detect and intercept the Palestinian attack, and even combat patrols were inexplicably absent. Palestinian drones easily neutralized automated machine guns and sensor towers, and Hamas assault teams breached the border without facing any opposition. Due to the failed alarm system, hundreds of IDF soldiers were killed in their camps, barracks, and while sleeping.

➡️Anomaly #4 – Hamas’ tactics.

Contrary to common belief, the Palestinians didn’t bypass IDF fortifications and bases. They aggressively assaulted both checkpoints and bases housing armored vehicles. Interestingly, Hamas chose not to use tanks, possibly due to the attackers’ low qualifications or a lack of necessity. The whereabouts of sentries, on-duty guards, and reinforcement units at that time remain unclear.

➡️Anomaly #5 – Combat vehicle readiness.

The destroyed Israeli Merkava Mk.4 tank, destroyed from a drone drop, was hit in one of its most vulnerable areas – the top. Moreover, the active protection system, Trophy, appears to have been disabled. Footage of the tank’s destruction and the capture of its crew clearly shows the gun was covered. This suggests the crew had not prepared the vehicle for combat and relied solely on intimidation, which not only constitutes a gross violation of procedure but is also ill-advised during such an attack.

➡️Anomaly #6 – Panic in border towns.

In all populated areas, especially in a region like the Gaza Strip, there should be plans in place for conflict escalation. However, there was no organized alert or evacuation. Local security forces were so undermanned and poorly armed that they were quickly overwhelmed by Palestinians.

➡️Anomaly #7 – The difference in coordination between IDF and Hamas.

Until nearly noon on October 7th, the Israeli government hardly reacted to the hostilities. It was Saturday morning, Shabbat. Only around 2-3 PM did the security forces begin gathering reserves and organizing counter-operations. However, the death of Commander of the Nahal infantry brigade, Yonatan Steinberg, suggests a rushed response by the forces that managed to assemble. It seems that Nahal’s involvement in combat against Hamas was initiated by the brigade commander and was not a direct order from the General Staff.

Furthermore, the IDF will likely commence a ground operation within Gaza neighborhoods in the next couple of days. However, actions in open terrain and urban areas differ significantly. An attempt by Israeli ground forces to enter the Palestinian enclave will almost certainly result in a high number of casualties on both sides.”

And yes, there is quite a bit of drone action too. Here’s some undated footage of Hamas drones on a training range (uploaded to my YouTube channel, please subscribe if you haven’t!).

I’ve also seen quite a bit of combat footage featuring Hamas troops storming IDF installations, with a lot of abandoned vehicles,equipment, and captured Israeli soldiers:

Incidentally, I don’t think I’ve seen even one photo or video of an IDF prisoner in uniform, let alone protective gear. This suggests that everybody was sleeping or jerking off when Hamas attacked. As for the rest of the country, it apparently fell apart into total chaos. IDF soldiers all surrendered immediately or turned and ran. The civilian population panicked and offered no resistance, and like the previously quoted text suggested, there seems to have been no plan or measures in place to prepare anyone for an attack. It seems that Israel somewhat literally put Chat GPT in charge of their national security without so much as a sentry in place to stop Hamas from capturing entire units wholesale. Furthermore there are many reports of accidents and friendly fire incidents. IDF troops are so terrified of Hamas infiltrators and so poorly trained they’re shooting each other at an astonishing frequency.

This fits in with the widely suspected trend of the IDF being increasingly lazy, inadequately trained and led, overly reliant on technology, and risk adverse. They’re good at bullying school children and indiscriminately bombing civilian neighborhoods, but not much else. IDF soldiers won’t risk their lives, not even to defend their own homes and families. They’ll drop their weapons (if they bothered to have any in the first place) and grovel. Hamas captured more territory in a single day than the entire Ukrainian army was able to capture in three months, which is pretty damn impressive but also indicative of the IDF being extremely weak and incapable. Hamas basically captured the amount of territory they were able to walk without stopping.

And there is also an allegation that Hamas was using Ukrainian equipment sold to them through the black market. Sonar21 has a pretty good article about it here.

There is a risk of this blowing up into a major war, but I find that to be unlikely. Any escalatory steps taken by Israel will absolutely set a contemporary precedent that could be repeated in the Ukraine conflict. Is it a good idea for Israel to launch a serious attack against, say, Iran for supporting Hamas when the USA is doing literally the same thing for Ukrainian forces? However Israel would like to punish all their neighbors for this humiliation, I would hope their Anglo have the sense to not let them. But who knows.

Regardless of how many weapons Hamas was able to stockpile, they will need continuing external help to survive a prolonged war with Israel, but hopefully it won’t come to that. Maybe, fingers crossed, this will turn into a negotiated solution after a couple of weeks. But maybe it won’t.

Earlier tonight a friend asked me what I think of the situation. I said I like Arabs, but they’re not famous for being particularly industrious or good at cooperating with each other. But Israel has succeeded in so thoroughly pissing off Hezbollah and then Hamas, they’ve both gotten their respective acts together over the years and become extremely competent military forces. It is simply not accurate to refer to them as terrorists. Terrorists don’t conquer and hold territory, armies do. Hamas is an army, and a good one.

Incredibly, the attack is still ongoing, with reports of a Hamas paraglider raid against the Tsalim military base, 40 kilometers away from the forward line of troops:

That’s all I have for now, I’ll keep everyone posted.

Please see my update to this post below:

Here’s How Hamas Ambushed the IDF

Ian Kummer

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