Retired Lt. Col. Boris Sanochkin weighs in on the Israel-US war against Iran so far. This post is an adaptation of several answers on Sanochkin’s blog on Quora.
What will Trump’s attacks on Iran achieve?
While several objectives are at play, the main approach toward Iran appears to be following the same path as the Venezuelan model. The approach is pretty simple: use aggression and the threat of stepping things up to get political obedience. If the resistance keeps up, take out the top leaders hoping that more cooperative people will step in and fall in line.
This reflects a broader reality—the decline of American military supremacy. Unable to impose outcomes through symmetric conventional means, there’s a move away from the usual rules of war and diplomacy, leaning instead toward outright terrorism.
The international community has known for some time that Europe now is a bad-faith actor. Now that the US is fully on board, this stance has spread across the Western world—bad news for anyone out there still counting on diplomacy.
Looking at it from a military angle, both sides seem to have picked up lessons from past errors, but the pattern still reminds me of the Twelve-Day War. This time around, it kind of worked in favor of the US-Israeli side at first, given their narrowly defined initial objectives.
Like during the Twelve-Day War, the US-Israeli side is still hesitant to enter Iran’s airspace, but they’ve honed the long-range strike capabilities, notably by using the Israeli Rampage and Blue Sparrow aero-ballistic missiles. You don’t see much drone footage of strikes happening inside Iran though. Unlike past crises, the Iranian command didn’t hesitate or seem confused at the start. The expected surge of internal sabotage never really took off, which suggests the counterintelligence was working better and the opposition wasn’t as strong as some expected.
Boosters of Israeli “mini-Kinzhal” hypersonic missile that crashed in Iraq.
A still from footage of the destruction of an MQ-9 drone, most likely by a Pantsyr SHORAD. There is visual evidence of about a dozen of such shootdowns.
The key thing is that the counterattacks started in only a few hours. Just like in the last conflict, Iran showed it had a big edge in firepower, striking Israeli and American targets hard in eight different countries.
An unopposed Shahed drone hits a radar/comm dome on the US Naval base at Bahrain that has already suffered multiple missile hits.
One thing you can’t miss is how much worse the already weak Israeli and American air defenses compared to the Twelve-Day War have gotten, mostly because they’re low on ammo after Ukraine and the Twelve-Day War. And while Israel at least puts in some effort to fight back, American targets just take hits without much resistance. Sometimes the response is there but so weak it’d be less embarrassing if there was none at all.
Still from PAC-3 MSE engagement footage from Al-Udeid AFB, Qatar: a statutory dual-salvo employed against a low-complexity ballistic target; both interceptors miss. The delayed commander’s decision authorizes a tertiary shot after the threat has already exceeded the intercept envelope—resulting in an inevitable third miss.
What made things harder for Iran was that the American bases had already been emptied days before the attack. Plus, Netanyahu had fled Israel, just like he did in the last fight. So, aiming to kill him or cause serious damage to the American personnel that way wasn’t really possible.
The alleged missile strike on Ayatollah’s residence.
People were saying that Iran got real-time access to a foreign strategic intelligence network, kind of like the access the US gave to Ukraine. The evidence suggests that wasn’t the case—otherwise, they would have launched a preemptive strike to make the most of their firepower advantage.
Looking at the current US strategy, it seems Washington is sticking to a plan of pulsed escalation—putting steady pressure on Iranian society bit by bit to push them into agreeing to its terms. This approach runs into some big challenges. Look at how awkwardly they are pushing the Shah’s heir: he hasn’t shown any care for the pain people in Iran are going through, but in his speeches he talks about handing over the country’s wealth to the American oligarchy if he becomes leader. This message really misses the mark, especially after the girls’ school massacre, but it’s a good indicator of how badly they handle their communication.
An out-of-touch interview of Trump’s “Shah.”
Even with its strong teeth, Iran is surrounded on all sides like fish in a barrel and can’t really strike back directly at the US. Its best bet is to keep the country united, crack down on opposition, and look for chances to cause mass casualties among US forces that Washington can’t ignore. The plan is simple: to put Trump’s questionable policies in conflict with his own domestic base and chip away at his political support. Since the chance to timely strike land bases was missed, it makes sense to turn attention to damaging the US fleets instead.
How does a single outdated FA-18 shoot down three F-15s all at once?
Largely because it is the only story that makes sense so far.
The theory of a land-based SAM was implausible from the outset. We’ve seen the video of a falling jet that had the frame largely intact, save the destruction of the control surfaces in the rear section. This is not consistent with a professional-grade SAM, which typically achieves a center-mass intercept on radar contact and carries a warhead in the ballpark of 200–400 pounds of high explosives, surrounded by pre-formed fragmentation designed for maximum lethality.
This assessment is reinforced by the fact that all six crew members were reported alive and well—something highly unlikely following proximate detonations of that magnitude.
Then a second video arrived, showing a jet with similar damage. At that point, it became clear the weapon was either a MANPADS or a short-range, infrared-guided air-to-air missile – both vagualy referred as heat-seeking – hitting the hottest side of the aircraft which is the engine exhaust. It is reasonable to lean toward the latter: a MANPADS typically carries around 6 pounds warhead of which about third are high explosives, whereas a short-range AAM can carry up to 20 pounds. I admit I have only seen Su-25s struck by MANPADS, where damage is normally confined to the outer engine compressor area with scattered shrapnel holes in adjacent structures. I can’t entirely exclude the possibility that an F-15 airframe is more fragile, might behave differently and suffer much heavier damage under similar energy transfer, as seen on the videos, but the air-to-air theory remained the more logically consistent explanation.
Three downed. Damage assessments indicate hits to engine exhaust, confined to the aft section. You can hardly believe one SAM proximity-fused at distance maraculously causing such damage, but not three consequent cases at once.
Then a third video appeared, showing the actual intercept. You see the impact point in the exhaust area, the destruction of control surfaces in the rear section, and—critically—no thick smoke trail consistent with the boost phase of an ascending SAM or MANPADS launch.
From that point, the mechanics of the incident became clear. It was either an Iranian MiG-29 that infiltrated Kuwaiti airspace to exploit the operational confusion and conduct opportunistic hits (a mission too risky and unlikely for that reason), or a local actor entertaining himself in a similar fashion—meaning a green-on-blue or blue-on-blue incident, as the Americans term it.
The AIM-9 Sidewinder – a small-sized short-range heat-seeking missile -the most likely culprit based on video evidence.
Why is Iran attacking Gulf Allies?
There is no doubt that those who planned this war had causing damage to the oil industries of Gulf petrocracies and, additionally, reputational damage to the UAE as a financial center on their minds. This stems from the fact that the US is seeking to establish itself as a top player in the oil and gas business, in which Saudi Arabia and Qatar are its main competitors. Also, the US near monopoly on energy trade may help them to choke China. And after London and Zurich proceeded to seize other people’s money, and with Trump trashing the USD, Dubai has established itself as the top financial capital—an issue that, according to neocons, needs fixing.
An office tower supposedly housing a CIA station in Dubai is hit.
That being said, the Gulf states are home to extensive US military infrastructure—you didn’t call them “allies” without reason—and are therefore legitimate military targets. There were attempts to call Iranian strikes on them “aggression,” but this rhetoric came mostly from the US and Europe, with the aim of drawing them into the war. The Gulf states themselves have issued moderate statements and have so far refused to take the bait.
THAAD radar in Jordan.
Importantly, Iran admits to carrying out strikes but claims they are not aimed at the Gulf states themselves but rather at US military installations and hotels that provide aid and comfort to the enemy. They vehemently deny targeting any oil and gas infrastructure—except for oil shipments passing through the Strait of Hormuz—while hinting at false flag operations in this connection. A brief overview of social media chatter suggests that many in the Gulf states share this view, blaming Israel, the United States, and their own governments for their situation. The strongest pro-Iranian sentiments are found in Bahrain and Kuwait, where Shiites constitute a majority or up to half of the population, but also in Qatar, where they form a small but highly politically active minority.
Alleged hit on an air defense site in UAE.
Regardless of their view on Iran, the prevailing sentiment across the Gulf is that Israel and the US have indeed provoked the entire conflict, only for Americans to hide rather than engage—leaving host populations to bear the brunt of retaliation. In the view of many locals, the poor performance of air defenses stems from the fact that the US cares primarily about Jews and withheld their resources for Israel. This perception forms the basis for questioning the reliability of the American security partnership, which appears to generate insecurity rather than prevent it.
Is the reason Trump is begging Iran for a ceasefire because he knows he’s not holding any cards?
Trump’s inconsistent statements are both a public relations strategy and an attempt to shape the agenda.
At this point, it is clear that the war is lost in terms of his main objective: Iran has rejected the Venezuelan scenario and, after a chain of Trump’s perfidious acts, is in no mood to offer him any sort of off-ramp.
A lukewarm Ayatollah who issued a fatwa against nuclear weapons and tried to make peace with Israel is replaced by a radical who has just lost his father, wife, and children.
What we see in the background is the continued destruction of US military infrastructure throughout the Middle East and the rapid deterioration of its ability to defend itself in any reasonable manner. The same is largely true for Israel. It is also notable that the destruction of elements of the US missile defense system has left Israel without early warning on Iranian strikes. Ironically, should Russia choose to launch a decapitating FOBS attack against the US via the southern route, the US would likewise be left without early warning.
The destruction of the Middle Eastern component of the US early-warning system has consequences not only for Israel.
Surprisingly, Iranian air defenses remain largely functional: there is regular evidence of them downing medium strike drones and JASSMs. My impression is that they are trying to preserve their higher-tier mobile systems for use once the enemy exhausts its long-range fires and attempts to commit manned aerial assets into the country.
Remnants of drones and missiles shot down over Iran.
For now, it seems the US and Israel are still able to continue their operations, but given how they are conducting them, their assets are likely not only to run out of ammunition but also to encounter a maintenance wall at some point.
If the above sounds one-sided, in reality it is not the case. Iran is being hit quite badly, but we also see what has become evident from the Libyan and Syrian campaigns: rather poor US intelligence analysis, resulting in most ordnance falling on odd targets, or multiple strikes on targets like firewood-grade aircraft or painted decoys on runways.
It is a grocery truck, not a missile launcher.
They are not real.
Where Trump has succeeded is in choking oil flows to Europe and Asia to a large extent. What he has failed to do is shape a consensus that this is Iran’s fault; consequently, it has turned into another public relations disaster, which he hopelessly tries to alleviate with strange claims—such as fantasies of the US Navy supposedly escorting oil tankers.
Ian Kummer
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